New Mexico Historical Review
Volume 54

Number 4

Article 3

10-1-1979

Termination and the Administration of Glenn L. Emmons as
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1953–1961
Debra R. Boender

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr

Recommended Citation
Boender, Debra R.. "Termination and the Administration of Glenn L. Emmons as Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 1953–1961." New Mexico Historical Review 54, 4 (2021). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr/
vol54/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in New Mexico Historical Review by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more information,
please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

TERMINATION AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
GLENN L. EMMONS AS COMMISSIONER
OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 1953-1961
DEBRA R. BOENDER

COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS GLENN L. EMMONS took the
oath of office on August 10, 1953, in a ceremony held in the office
of Secretary of the Interior Douglas McKay. 1 Emmons was appointed to this post because President Eisenhower wished to
follow the desires of Indians in selecting a new Commissioner. 2
Alva Simpson, Jr., the other major candidate along withEmmons,
was a prominent New Mexican, but he failed to gather enough Indian backing to suit Eisenhower. 3 Although there was some bitter
opposition to Emmons's appointment in the Senate, he was confirmed after a second set of hearings held in July 1953. 4 At that
time Emmons was reluctant to leave his bank in Gallup but felt it
was his duty to respond to the summons of the President, stating,
"I . . . thought if a man was chosen for a job like this, it was a
challenge and his duty, as a good American, to answer the call."
Comparing the call of the President to military service or court
duty he said: "It was just as much of a mandate in the same sense
of the word."5
Years of association with individual New Mexico and Arizona
Indians caused Emmons to enter office with a plan of action in
mind. He was familiar with many of the problems which they
faced, and he was aware that the needs of these Indians varied
from other tribes across the nation. Emmons was able to see three
major problems which most tribes faced in varying degrees and
proportions: poor health conditions, poor education, and poor
economic development. It was his goal to attempt their solution
while in office. 6 During an era when Congress favored termination
of Indian tribes, Emmons's programs seemed to coincide with
0028-6206/79/ I 000-0287$01.80/0
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popular Congressional policy by preparing Indians for release
from the federal trusteeship status. Actually his programs served
to involve further the federal government in Indian affairs.
Emmons recognized that for most tribes a terminated status was
far in the future, and immediate goals were of necessity more
realistic than those that Congress set. To Emmons the word "termination" was anathema, so he called his proposed program "readjustment with security," thereby avoiding the bad connotations
arising from "termination."7 He did believe that at some future
date Indians ought to become self-supporting.
Before initiating his three-point program, Emmons recognized
that Department of Interior priorities had to be met. He conducted
an intensive survey of the Bureau of Indians Affairs (BIA) in October 1953, which gave special attention to the organizational
structure of the Bureau, operating policies and procedures, including fiscal matters, delegations and redelegations of authority,
and legislative authority for BIA programs. Assistant Secretary of
Interior Orme Lewis requested Emmons to "give special attention
to the status and development of programs for the Indians to take
over responsibility for their own affairs, and the relation of the Indians to state and local governments."8 During 1953 the Interior
Department pushed for termination in an infamous memorandum, which Emmons strongly opposed and then largely ignored.
Commissioner Emmons was directed to enact programs designed to bring tribal groups to a level whereby they would be able
to support themselves with minimal federal assistance. Contrary
to stated BlA policy, Emmons neither favored nor forwarded that
policy. Having always maintained a dislike of the termination
policy, Emmons carefully avoided facing the issue directly while
Commissioner. He seldom testified before Congressional committees on the issue of termination; instead he sent his assistant, Rex
Lee; to present the BIA point of view, which seems to have diverged measurably from Emmons's personal feelings. There is a
noticeable absence of definite statements by Emmons about termination, and the few that do exist refer to termination at some
distant time after Indians became prepared educationally and economically.
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When Menominee termination plans reached fruition in 1954,
Emmons did nothing to block the bill. Blocking action of any sort
would most probably have failed to be effective with Congress,
since Senator Arthur V. Watkins of Utah, and others, had already
decided to implement a termination policy. That policy originated
under Harry Truman's and former Commissioner Dillon S. Myer's
administration before Emmons became Commissioner. Emmons
might have been successful, however, in approaching Eisenhower
and asking for a presidential veto. Perhaps because of political
considerations he did not take any overt action. After the Menominee Termination Act was passed in 1954, the BIA maintained a
"hands off policy" when plans were being drafted for the implementation of the act. For that reason the tribe sought aid from
the state of Wisconsin. 9 Conspicuous uninvolvement on behalf of
the BIA certainly indicated reluctance on Emmons's part to implement actively an immediate termination policy.
Emmons did not institute programs which would lead to rapid
termination. What was known as the "Emmons Plan" was a threepoint program designed to improve the health, education, and
economy of federally recognized tribes and groups of Indians. Indian health problems were of major importance to Emmons. On
August 5, 1954, Eisenhower approved the transfer of BIA health
programs to the United States Public Health Service. This action
meant that fifty-five hospitals and other facilities, in addition to
about one-fourth of BIA health program personnel, were involved
in this transfer. 1o This action, completed in July 1955, caused an
increase in the level and effectiveness of health services provided
to Indians. BIA health programs were notoriously inadequate, and
although under the Public Health Service they were still lacking in
some respects, overall improvements in health care were very encouraging. Many tribes feared this move was the beginning of
"piecemeal termination" but soon realized that their fears were
groundless when services improved.
Under the BIA the Indian health program was subject to nonprofessional administration and suffered from staffing problems.
Indian populations were too small to generate economically sound
use of BIA facilities; whereas under the Public Health Service,
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facilities would attract other groups of persons and be put to better use. More personnel, facilities, and funds were at the disposal
of the Public Health Service, and as a result better service was
available to Indians. Despite warnings of administrative upheavals, Indian health services were transferred to the U.S. Public
Health Service with the general feeling that benefits would exceed
problems. I I
Through this transfer, though reservation health care began to
approximate more nearly that which non-Indians received in the
United States, it still lagged some twenty years behind health care
of the overall population. In 1956 the National Congress of
American Indians gave their approval to the Indian Health Program of the Public Health Service. 12 Step one of Emmons's plan
was accomplished, or at least set in motion by 1955. Education
and economic improvements were not accomplished as readily;
they required more intensive study and organization.
Emmons accomplished much of this study himself by making
his office open to Indian requests and recommendations and by
traveling extensively among tribes throughout the nation. In
September 1953 at Eisenhower's request, he toured major tribal
groupS.13 Throughout his administration he consulted frequently
with tribes all over the country. In addition to his tour of tribes in
1953, Emmons met with Indian leaders again in 1956 and 1958
to study their problems and to hear their ideas for improved Indian services. 14 Subsequent discussions with tribes confirmed Emmons's hypothesis that tribal needs were large because demands
for better education and economy were numerous.
Educational problems ran rampant among almost all tribes,
especially those on large or remote reservations. Emmons was
familiar with the problems on the huge Navajo reservations where
population was scattered and ~here there were not enough
schools. Many Navajo children were not in school, and those that
were attending schools did so at a great distance from home, thus
alienating them from their tribal customs and identity. Emmons
used a supplemental appropriation to place thousands of Navajo
children in school. Day schools were converted to boarding
schools, makeshift schools were constructed from quonset huts,
trailer schools were put into use, and public school systems were
requested to admit Indian children. IS

TABLE 1: Distribution of Indian Children Attending School by Type of School and Percent (Excluding Alaskan Natives)

Year

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961

Total Children
Between 6-18 yrs.

Total
No. in
School

128,133
127,213
128,053
132,171
139,036
141,572
141,581
144,069
145,998
125,450

99,441
100,883
104,470
115,631
122,855
125,555
129,760
131,927
133,316
112,746

%

78
79
82
87
88
89
92
92
91
90

No. in
Cov't Sch.

36,414
36,194
35,586
39,862
39,676
38,295
39,677
38,911
37,377
38,876

%

No. in
Public Sch.

37
36
34
35
32
30
30
30
28
34

52,960
54,417
58,855
65,089
71,956
76,250
78,822
81,098
84,650
64,987

%

No. in
Othcr Sch.

%

No. not % of
Enrolled Total

53
54
56
56
59
61
61
61
64
58

10,067
10,272
10,029
10,680
11,223
11,010
11,261
11,918
11,289
8,883

10
10
10
9
9
9
9
9
8
8

28,692
26,330
23,583
16,540
16,181
16,017
11,821
12,142
12,682
12,704

22
21
18
13
12
II
8
8
9
10

No. of
Those with
No Info.

(6,649)
(4,256)
(6,408)
(5,870)
(7,552)
(3,030)
(3,179)
(3,80 I)
(3,013)

Figures compiled from: U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Branch of Education, Statistics Concerning Indian Education
(Lawrence, KS: Haskell Institute, Fiscal Years 1952-1961) 110 separate publications).

N

<D

292

TABLE 2: Navajo Children Between 6-18 Years Attending School:
Fiscal Years 1952-1961.
Year

Total
Children

Total
in School

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961

26,336
27,106
27,362
27,752
29,519
29,585
30,376
31,151
31,743
34,604

13,135
14,106
15,50 I
22,741
24,163
25,475
26,903
26,859
27,407
28,824

%

in School
50
52
57
82
82
86
89
86
86
83

Total Not
in School
13,201
13,000
11,861
5,011
5,356
4,110
3,473
4,292
4,336
5,780

%

Not in School
50
48
43
18
18
14
II
14
14
17

In 1953 more than 26,000 Indian children of school age were
not attending school. Approximately 13,000 of these were Navajos. Forty-eight percent of the 27,106 Navajo children were not
attending any school. I6 Through programs of an experimental
nature, Emmons attempted to solve this problem as rapidly as
possible. Debate raged in Congress when he asked for an additional $3 million appropriation after the regular budgeting had
allowed $11 million for Indian education. Congressman John J.
Rhodes of Arizona championed this request for greater funding,
citing the unique problems Navajos faced in their large reservation. Many Navajo families were nomadic, and this characteristic
influenced school attendance. When Navajo children resided near
a school, they attended classes. When their parents lived apart
from schools, the children were frequently absent. Rhodes noted
that Emmons had already begun to solve the problem by instituting a system of trailer schools which were sufficiently portable to shift location when the Indian population did. These
trailers would immediately provide schools for three to four thousand Indian children. Secondly, Rhodes noted, the program which
Emmons called for would place Navajo children in schools
located along reservation borders. Since many of these towns and
cities tended to be small, they needed federal support to provide
additional space for Indian students. 17
Despite provisions of the Johnson-O'Malley Act (1934), which

TABLE 3: Types of BIA Schools: Fiscal Years 1952-1961. (Excluding Alaska).

Year

Boarding Schools
NonReservation Reservation

Regular

1952

Boarding
and Day
14

Non-Res.
18/140

17

Trailer

0

Day Schools
Instructional
Hogan
Aid
Navajo
Community
41

Hospital

Total

0

0

230

13

0

Navajo
Community
1953

21

1954

89
including
four dorms

34

213

5

36/2

226 including four sanatoriums

1955

16

23 Nav/46

198

37

16

14

324
315

4 (san.)

II Dorm.
365

1956

15

68

184

29

8

13

4

321

1957

15

64

182

28

3

12

4

308

1958

15

65

177

23

I

10

3
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1959

15

64

179

18

I

5

3

285

1960

15

62

176

15

0

4

5

277

1961

15

62

170

14

0

4

5

270

Figures for Table 2 and Table 3 compiled from: U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Branch of Education, Statistics Concerning Indian Education (Lawrence, KS: Haskell Institute, Fiscal Years 1952-1961) [10 separate publicalions].

N
<C

w

294

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW 54:4 1979

provided federal reimbursement to states for non-taxable Indian
lands so that Indian children might attend school, Congress was
reluctant to appropriate the requested $3 million. Numerous representatives provided excuses that Congress had never before
appropriated money to build school facilities outside of Indian territory, that other tribes might demand the same type of aid, that
this program was a break from traditional Indian service budgeting procedures, and that there was no guarantee the program
would work. These roadblocks eventually gave way to allow Emmons's plan for improved Indian education to go into effect. IS
Public school systems soon began to admit Navajo and other Indian children after Emmons assured school systems complete federal funding for additional expenses. lg Within just a few years,
almost all of the 13,000 Navajo children were in school. A system
of bordertown dormitories dotted areas around the Navajo reservation. Emergency quarters were set up, sometimes making dual
use of gyms and dining areas and other available spaces so that
they might be used as sleeping areas until regular dormitories
were constructed. 20 Children living in these dormitories were
relatively close to home, to which they returned on weekends. By
use of this system, Indian students became accustomed to Anglo
society and yet retained their native culture. Emmons realized the
need of Navajos to learn how to live among Anglos without losing
tribal identity. Many Navajos, raised on the reservations and attending all-Indian schools, were unable to face the prospect of
dealing daily with non-Indian schools; Emmons hoped to solve
this problem and to confront the lack of adequate educational
facilities. 21
A distinction wa.s made in this plan between older and younger
children. Those below third grade level attended mobile trailer
schools, while older students lived in the bordertown dorms. 22 Emmons felt that this was a sensible decision because young children
should not be separated from their families. 23
A great deal of national publicity was given this program on the
Navajo reservation. In some counties Indian children attended
public day schools and returned home at night. Results of this program provided greater education opportunities for Indian children, as the speed with which it went into effect placed numerous
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children into schools who might never have attended under the
older system. In 1959 a leading national magazine termed Emmons's plan "the most ambitious program of schooling ever
launched for American Indians."24
By 1955, eighty-seven percent of all Indian children were in
some type of school, and of this total thirty-five percent were in
federal schools. An approximate ten percent increase in enrollment over the previous year was a clear indication of the intensity
of Emmons's determination. 25
Recent newspaper accounts have lauded the success of the
bordertown dormitory system, which Emmons began in 1954.
Twenty-year dormitory contracts issued in the first year expired in
1974 but were renewed on a shorter term basis to keep Indian
children in public schools. Not only have these dorms been successful in enriching Indian lives, but school directors contend that
the presence of Indian children also enriches the environment of
the non-Indian children. 26
Although the numbers of students in school at anyone time cannot determine the quality of education, these figures do indicate
improved opportunities for many Indian children. At the end of
the fiscal year 1952, only seventy-eight percent of all Indian
children were in school. During the administration of Emmons,
this figure rose considerably, reaching a high point of ninety-two
percent in 1958-1959 and leveling off to about ninety percent by
the end of 1961. During this same period a general reshuffling of
Indian student population occurred among schools of all types. An
increased use of public schools became evident, while use of
federal government schools declined. Indians made less use of
other schools, including all types of private and parochial schools.
At the same time, additional boarding and day schools were built
and used on reservations. In 1952no trailer schools were in operation, nor were any hospital schools in use. By 1955 thirty-seven
trailer schools were operating, and four hospital schools located in
sanatoriums served a number of reservations. All of these improvements in the Indian educational system meant that by the
time Emmons left office in 1961 a higher percentage of Indian
children were attending school than ever before.
Not only were the young being salvaged, but also older tribal
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members in an adult education curriculum that stressed English
courses in the improved education programs. This program was
launched among Florida Seminoles, Arizona Papagos, South
Dakota Sioux, North Dakota Chippewas, and Idaho Shoshones.
Emmons was quoted as saying, "Thousands of Indians are
separated from the modern world by a language barrier. No
wonder they have such a difficulty earning a living. "27
Emmons encountered the problems of adult illiteracy during his
tour of tribes in the autumn of 1953. When he asked an audience
of Florida Seminoles deep in the Everglades to raise their hands if
they would like to learn to read and write English, almost every
hand was raised. Emmons promised to include the Seminoles as
part of the new adult educational program he was devising. 28
Response to the program was overwhelming, and it became successful among those tribes where many could not communicate
well in English. Leading experts in the field of Indian education
suggested that the adult education program concentrate on five
areas: personal progress and self-reliance; family life and home
improvement; permanent gainful employment; social adjustment
and mobility; broadened horizons through the perception and
solution of problems of personal and public concern. 29
Emmons also instituted an adult Education and Vocational Program designed to meet the needs of those Indians who wished to
move off the reservations. Relocation of Indians to urban communities played a major role in his plans to create self-supporting
tribes, and adult vocational training was an important segment of
this program.
Vocational job training was offered to all Indians. Skilled work
training was an essential element of the Emmons plan. This training provided opportunity for off-reservation living and also expanded the reservation job market by creating attractive localities
for businesses and industries. Women as well as men were educated under this program. Often untrained women were fearful of
leaving the reservation and facing a world about which they knew
little. Thus families were kept united during the training period,
and risk of breaking up homes was greatly reduced. To Emmons
this was a real and relevant concern. 30
Although relocation was not a success, the concept fit Em-
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mons's goal of eventually releasing Indian tribes. Later changes in
the program improved it somewhat. Relocation was definitely not
intended in Emmons's view to be "piecemeal termination" any
more than the shift of BIA health programs was. Emmons was
trying only to improve personal and tribal living conditions for Indians, to afford them an opportunity to take part in the mainstream society. Even the National Congress of American Indians
(NCAI) approved voluntary relocation during their convention of
1955. 31 Clearly, Emmons did not favor forced relocation and was
a strong supporter of making the program completely voluntary.
He did not initiate relocation programs; these policies began under
the previous administration in 1948 and continued on into the
new administration that took office in 1961. Relocation is still
very much a part of current Indian policy, but it is disguised under
various program names. As recently as 1972 relocation was a part
of the Employment Assistance Program, which supposedly opened
new avenues in the redirection of resources to improve reservation
economies. 32 This "new" goal remains nothing more than a rediscovery of the third part of the Emmons Plan-economic development. Job skills of the adult educational and vocational training
programs were an essential and primary part of this goal. Emmons was trying to provide Indians with a choice other than a
meagre existence on the reservation.
If Emmons did not favor forced relocation, he did support reclamation of Indian land wherever possible, promotion of tribal industries, and production of food and livestock for sale by agrarian
Indians. 33 Agrarian pursuits were considered part of economic
development and no less an industry than mining or manufacturing. Thus, land reclamation and other economic improvements
were major ingredients of the Emmons Plan.
In 1955 the BIA began studying possibilities of industrial development that would increase employment among Indians who did
not wish to participate in relocation programs. Originally, considerations were directed toward an "Indians only" program, but
increased study indicated that area-wide development benefitting
Indians and non-Indians was necessary. In October 1957 the
Branch of Industrial Development was established 34 and sought to
achieve two major objectives: to get Indian and non-Indian groups

General Eisenhower and Glenn Emmons on the balcony at the airport in Gallup, on August 10, 1952. Courtesy of Glenn L. Emmons.
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working together to create an environment as attractive as possible for future industrial development; and to help compile the
necessary brochures and fact sheets industrial companies needed
to decide where to locate a plant. 35 This program seemed to cater
to Indians of the Southwest-Navajos, Pueblos, and Apaches.
Three hundred thousand dollars was appropriated by the Navajo
Tribal Council for use in obtaining plants and vocational training.
Similar projects were also underway among the Dakota Sioux. 36
Across the nation tribes used tribal lands or purchased land upon
which to build plants and businesses. On the Navajo reservation
oil, uranium, and coal deposits were discovered and developed. In
1953 there were oil leases on only 218,660 acres of Navajo land,
and after additional leasing by 1959 there were 1,594,609 acres
leased, bringing fifty million dollars into"the tribal treasury with
two million more each year from rents and royalties. 37 During
1950 an additional $800,000 from uranium and coal mining was
added to the tribal treasury. 38 In a parallel action in the wise use of
natural resources, Emmons stressed the best possible use of water
resources so that agrarian Indians could remain on their homelands to produce food and livestock for consumption and sale.
During Emmons's administration a number of industries were
encouraged to locate on or near the reservations, and tribes were
urged to begin their own enterprises. Small industries were first attracted, but many of these tribal businesses either collapsed or
changed hands or names. In the long run the Emmons Plan was
quite successful, for during the 1960s numerous new industries a ppeared. Before 1962 the program was not large and fought continuously for acceptance. 39
Economic development was also dependent upon access roads
to the reservations. Aware that in many areas these roads were
either non-existent or in such poor condition as to be unusable,
Emmons directed part of his economic development program
toward solving this problem. He linked agricultural development
and road building as priorities of the BIA. 40 This road building
project was apparently a great success, for on the day Emmons
left office in 1961, he received a memorandum from Chief of the
BIA Roads Division stating: "More roads and bridges were built
under your term as Commissioner than under all other Commissioners combined."41
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Thus by 1961 Emmons's three-point program had been implemented. It bore close resemblance to, and was harmonious
with, the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Program of 19 April 1950. 42
Emmons's three-point program had a broader base, although
many of his programs did cater to the Navajos and other tribes of
the Southwest.
Glenn L. Emmons remained in the office of Commissioner of Indian Affairs for seven and one-half years. At his retirement in
January 1961, Emmons received a letter from President Dwight
D. Eisenhower which accepted his resignation from office, effective January 20, 1961. Eisenhower thanked him for having
"served faithfully and well" and also for doing his "honest best to
help the Indians achieve a better way of life. "43 Hard work
brought praise for Emmons from many other quarters, and, as
with every public official, criticism from some. He was presented
with a Distinguished Service Award from the Interior Department
in 1957-the only Commissioner to receive that award while in office. This award, the highest given by the Department of the Interior, was for "outstanding achievement in materially improving
the health protection, the educational facilities, and the economic
prospects for Indian people."44 During 1958, Emmons was again
honored, this time by a Resolution of the Navajo Tribal Council
"in support and appreciation of the services of Glenn L. Emmons,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to the American Indians. "45
Neither the Kennedy, Johnson nor Nixon administrations
changed the primary programs Emmons initiated; however, the
names and reputations of his policies were affected. Some of Emmons's programs were successful, some were not. Congress bears
the greater weight in determining what Indian policy will be
through passage of resolutions, laws, and budgets; the Commissioner of Indian Affairs does not. His job is administrative, and
under that classification Emmons did reasonably well. Emmons
did not always agree with or understand Congressional policy, but
he did his best to get Congress to finance the programs which he
felt were necessary to improve Indian life.
It seems possible that Emmons never fully understood Congressional policies of termination. BIA personnel hinted that perhaps
this was so and that his strong ties to his program proposals
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blinded Emmons to other ideas. If this was indeed the case, then
one might question the success of Emmons as Commissioner.
Some scholars have denied him any credit for improving federal
Indian policies. That seems to be an excessively harsh judgment of
a man who devoted so much energy trying to improve the health
care, schools, and economic livelihood of Indians. Despite the
probability that Emmons remained unaware of the seriousness
with which Congress was pursuing termination, he deserves credit
for the beneficial results of his administration.
Generally two results might occur when an official is unaware
of stated policy goals. Disaster is the more common result, but in
this case Emmons met with general success, the other possibility.
Emmons's three-point program brought about the death of termination as an official policy even if the demise was a gradual
one. That Emmons himself could not predict this eventual outcome is certain. He seemed ignorant of the realities of Congressional policy, or at least he feigned a convincing ignorance. May
we then criticize him for not keeping abreast of official policy?
Considering his successes over a relatively short span of time, Emmons cannot be shunted off into the group of so-called "bad Commissioners." This is one of the proverbial examples when the end
seems to justify the means.
Although no permanent solution to federal Indian policy
emerged from Emmons's administration, at least an effective end
to termination was brought about through increased federal involvement with Native Americans. In the final analysis one must
agree that Emmons, despite his ineffectiveness in dealing directly
with the termination issue, was a concerned and hardworking
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
NOTES
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